Malihe Razazan: In this issue of Status, we discuss Turkey’s military invasion of the Kurdish enclave of Afrin in northwestern Syria with Dr. Cengiz Gunes, an associate lecturer at the Open University in the UK. On January 20, Turkey launched the so-called Operation Olive Branch in the northern Syrian enclave of Afrin. Turkish ground troops crossed the border into Syria alongside thousands of Turkey-backed Syrian rebels. The Turkish government has stated that its goal is to root out an armed militia called the People’s Protection Units (YPG), which it views as a threat to its security. Turkey views the YPG as an extension of the PKK, which has struggled for the rights of Kurdish people in Turkey for decades. After two months of fighting, on March 18, Turkey announced that the city of Afrin has been taken and Turkish President Erdogan suggested that the current military campaign could be extended to other Kurdish-led border areas east of Afrin in Syria. Status contributor, Shahram Aghamir, spoke with Dr. Gunes about the Turkish invasion of Afrin, an enclave in northwestern Syria.
Cengiz Gunes: The Turkish operation began on 24 January, 2018 and it continued for around 2 months, with the Afrin town falling to the control of the Turkish army and its affiliated militias on the 17th of March. Afrin is in the northwestern part of Syria. It is disconnected from other Kurdish-populated regions, so in a way, it is an enclave. A large number of Kurdish forces have left the area on the 18th of March. Some have retreated to the rural areas of Afrin, others have gone to other Kurdish-controlled regions. At the moment, there are a kind of hit-and-run attacks conducted by Kurdish forces. The conflict is going on in Afrin, but in a much more reduced capacity. And given the Russian backing to Turkey’s action and the silence of the international community and its failure to condemn the Turkish action in Afrin, in a way, it was expected that Afrin would fall. But I, personally, wasn’t expecting the People’s Protection Units – the YPG – I was expecting them to engage with the Turkish army and the Turkish-affiliated groups in battle in the urban areas. But they have decided against it because it would have resulted in a large number of casualties. And also the Turkish attacks targeted civilians before, and they have also destroyed the vital infrastructure of the region – the water plants, and schools, and hospitals. Afrin was largely spared from the conflict until the Turkish invasion and it was relatively peaceful region. It received, also, internally displaced people from the neighboring areas of Syria. So in a way, it was a kind of a symbol of coexistence in Syria. Because it was disconnected from other areas under the control of Kurdish-led forces, it was quite a vulnerable area for an attack, and Turkey exploited it to its advantage.
Shahram Aghamir: Before the Turkish invasion, Afrin was home to more than 300,000 people. More than a third of the population was internally displaced. The region had been a destination for Syrians who had been displaced by the war. 60% of the population of the Afrin region had been already in need of humanitarian aid before the latest violence. An estimated 150,000 people have been displaced following Turkey’s capture of the northern Syrian city of Afrin. What can you tell us about the plight of these people?
CG: There is a humanitarian crisis brewing in Afrin. Previously, the UN called for a ceasefire so that aid can reach the people. And recently, the International Committee of the Red Cross called for access to the region so that it can distribute aid to the civilians trapped there. In terms of the numbers who have left Afrin and who are now displaced, I think most of them went to Kurdish areas, such as Tel Rifat, and I think the capacity of these areas to host such a large number of displaced people is not very high, but at least there is aid that is reaching them because the agencies have access to those areas. So there are two issues – one is the plight of those people who have been displaced and the other issue is the people who have remained, who could not leave Afrin. Those people, they need help with immediate needs because the infrastructure has been destroyed. So there is not like running water, services have been affected. The worry is that the longer the Turkish control, the local population will suffer more. And it seems that Turkey is unwilling to enable access to those areas, other than its own Red Cross, which the Kurds don’t really trust. So there is also widespread looting by the Turkish-backed forces. They’re kind of stealing livestock, tractors, etc. There are also instances of mistreatment of civilians and there are instances where the Turkish-backed forces are torturing Kurds. This has circulated through Twitter. So there is a real worry that all Kurds in Afrin will become displaced and Turkey will use Afrin to settle Syrian refugees who are currently in Turkey.
SA: This invasion of Afrin happened around the same time as the Kurdish population was getting ready to celebrate Nowruz, the new year. It’s almost like a double-whammy to make people go through this pain and agony on the eve of their celebration of the new year.
CG: Actually, one of the actions that they have taken was to destroy the statue of Kāveh the Blacksmith, who in the Kurdish narrative of Nowruz, is the main character who kind of organizes a rebellion against the Assyrian king, Dahāg. In a way, they are destroying the symbols of Kurdish identity and they are targeting, in a symbolic way, Kurds’ attempt to assert their identity.
SA: The Turkish military and their allies, Syrian rebels, they seem to consist of thousands of fighters who are referred to as the Free Syrian Army. Who are these people and what is their political and ideological makeup?
CG: These groups that were fighting in Syria and that did receive help from Turkey, what happened was Turkey kind of brought them together again and constituted them in an army. These are groups which are mainly Turkoman forces and also groups that are linked to the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and that were previously part of other Islamist factions or part of the Free Syrian Army. There many groups – groups that were previously part of the Nurettin Zengi Brigade. So these are the Turkmans and they have been in the news because of their very harsh treatment of certain people, the Sunni Islamist groups. But they have been kind of rehabilitated by Turkey and presented again as kind of a moderate force that’s going to fight against the Kurds – because, for Turkey, the Kurds are a terrorist group, the YPG especially. And also, they are saying that they will take up a fight against the Islamist forces in Idlib, but we don’t know yet whether that will happen or not.
SA: Cengiz, let’s talk about this issue of why Afrin and what were the reasons behind the Turkish military invasion of Afrin.
CG: Afrin, as I mentioned, it’s isolated from other Kurdish areas. So in a way, it’s an easy target. But the immediate reason – the pretext – was the US announcement that it is training a new border force to protect areas that it’s Kurdish and Arab allies control. This announcement was later retracted. But Turkey wasn’t satisfied with subsequent statements and, as a result, decided to take action to dislodge Kurdish forces in Syria. So that’s the kind of immediate reason given. But we know that Turkey has always maintained a hostile attitude towards the Kurds in Syria and the new Kurdish-led autonomous entity that came into being in July 2012. Turkey sees Kurdish autonomy as a threat to its national security and feels that its consolidation, which the American statement hinted at, will change the game in Kurds’ favor forever. Turkey sees its Kurdish movement, the PKK, and Syria’s Kurdish movement as essentially one and the same. And for Turkey, they are a terrorist movement. And Turkey has done everything it can to prevent the Kurds in Syria from gaining more international recognition. Turkey has done everything it can to stop Kurdish autonomy from succeeding. It kind of facilitated the transfer of fighters to Northern Syria. Most of the people who’ve ended up in ISIS have arrived in Syria via Turkey. It kind of turned a blind eye to transportation of the jihadist because it knew that Kurdish forces would become ISIS’s adversary. Through ISIS, Turkey will prevent the Kurds gaining recognition or more power. So when the US began working with the Kurdish forces to defeat ISIS, Turkey was not happy with that at all, and Erdogan many times complained that the US was supplying weapons to the Kurdish forces and that was unacceptable and the US should stop doing that. Such statements were very, very frequent. Turkey applied diplomatic pressure on the US to stop working with the Kurdish forces and this pressure was particularly intense, especially at the start of the new Trump administration. When Turkey couldn’t succeed, Turkey started to cultivate stronger ties with Russia. And through allying itself with Russia, it strengthened its position in Syria and stop the Kurds gaining recognition through its actions. Because if Turkey is stronger on the ground, it can do more to prevent Kurds from gaining recognition and its ties with Russia enabled Turkey to do that. Turkey has also consistently opposed the inclusion of Kurdish-led administrations in the international peace conferences, such as the Geneva talks. And it’s through diplomacy, through the leverage it gained, that Turkey has tried to prevent Kurds from gaining recognition within Syria and gaining acceptance. And it hasn’t managed to prevent the Kurds from consolidating their de facto autonomy. And the only action that was left for Turkey to do was to take military action, and that’s what it did. What I’ve mentioned is directly related to Turkey’s attitudes towards Kurds in Syria, but there is also a domestic factor.
SA: Mm-hmm
CG: As you know, Erdogan reformed Turkey’s political regime and introduced an executive-style presidency. This was done with the support from the nationalist party – the Nationalist Action Party. And he has continued to work with the Nationalist Action Party and will take part in the forthcoming elections, which are currently scheduled for 2019. And Erdogan is going to take in that election within a block. The Afrin operation helps Erdogan to consolidate his Turkish nationalist base and use the appeal of Turkish nationalism to mobilize voters.
SA: And keep its alliance of convenience, actually, with this party.
CG: There are people who say it’s an alliance of convenience, but there is much more in common between the Nationalist Action Party and Erdogan because both accept the importance of religion in Turkish national identity. [SA: Right, right] So in a way, Erdogan is more religious than nationalist, but –
SA: And both neoliberal parties too, right? I mean that’s a –
CG: Right, right, in terms of economics. Opposition to the Kurds enables Erdogan to unify the Turkish nationalist base and also consolidate it. He presents himself as the person who has taken all the necessary actions to defeat the Kurds. So whether he will defeat the Kurds in Syria and then in Turkey, we don’t know. But this is what he is trying to do.
SA: Shortly after the fall of Afrin, in a speech in Ankara, Turkish President Erdogan said the military operation will continue until the ‘terror corridor,’ as he calls it, through Manbij, Ayn al-‘Arab – which is the same as Kobani – and Tel Abyad. How likely is that scenario? What is the end game of the Turkish state in Syria? You kind of mentioned that, but one would expect that President Erdogan has abandoned his earlier plans for Syria and given up his ambitions of Turkey becoming the regional hegemon. Or has he not?
CG: I think he hasn’t given up on that attempt to become the regional hegemon. Turkey wants to be a strong player in Syria and will expand its control to achieve that. In a way, it will do everything it can to increase its territorial control in Syria. Initially, Turkey saw the Arab Spring as an opportunity to extend its sphere of influence and build regimes that are similar to its own. It tried to impose its model of Islamic conservative democracy, if you like, on the rest of the countries in the region. It was keen to also empower and support similar groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and it formed very close ties with the Muslim Brotherhood and the FSA – the Free Syrian Army – in Syria as well. Creating such similar regimes, it thought that the region would become politically more like Turkey. Now, in Syria, the endgame was to create a Sunni-dominated regime under groups that are close to Erdogan ideologically. When it became clear that the Asad regime was not going to be defeated militarily, essentially after Russia began operating in Syria, and when it became clear that the Kurdish actors are becoming more powerful, as a result of the civil war, Turkey began to look for ways that it can cut its losses. At the moment, the policy seems to be revolving around minimizing the gains that the Kurds will get in Syria.
SA: And having a foothold in Syria in the post-conflict era, right?
CG: Yes, definitely, yes. Because it wants to be able to support the groups that it built up – the Sunni-dominated opposition – in order to kind of have a say at the end, if and when a peace process starts. Erdogan still, time to time, makes statements about restoring Turkey’s lost influence in the region and he goes back to the Ottoman times and presents those times as a golden age of Turkish power and dominance. So he wants to recreate the influence that the Ottoman Empire enjoyed and forge ties with neighboring countries on the basis of Islamic solidarity. That’s his kind of ideological objectives. I think he’s aware that it’s not going to be very easy to achieve those and in order to remain a meaningful actor, it needs to dislodge the Kurdish forces. The areas that Turkey wants to control are also areas that the Kurds either have control or want to control as well. And the areas to the east of the Euphrates River, those areas alongside the border with Turkey, are all under control of the Syrian Democratic Forces. This is the umbrella organization of which the YPG is a main part, are Kurdish-led forces. This area is also where America operates and America has bases and personnel there. So Manbij, for example, is in the west of the river Euphrates and it has been drawing some attention, especially in the past few weeks, because Erdogan is saying that the Kurdish forces should leave Manbij. And the official line is that the Kurdish forces who took part in capturing Manbij have actually left the area, but now there is a civilian-controlled administration which is part of the Kurdish-led autonomous region. So Turkey wants to eliminate that administration to create its own administration. There was a statement by Turkish foreign minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu and he said that America and Turkey have reached an agreement on the future management of Manbij. But later on, he kind of withdrew the statement and there seems to be still a dialogue, but at the moment, there isn’t a clear solution presented. What Turkey wants is that part of Kurdish-held territory to be given either to a Turkish-led force or to Turkey to have influence in that area. And Turkey is presenting an argument that the Kurds have kind of come in to Arab-populated areas and they are overtaking those areas, they are creating displacement, and you know, in a way, they are displacing Arabs and settling Kurds and such. There’s a lot of claims and a lot of accusations like that, but the people that were in Manbij are still there. This displacement isn’t happening and the groups that have been cooperating together in this administration and they are taking part in the management or governance of the region. I think Turkey will try to use force to dislodge Kurdish forces in Manbij and other areas, but it’s not going to be as easy because the US is there. So it depends on what the US will do. In Afrin, the US did not have any forces there and did not provide support or add defenses against attacks in Afrin. But in other areas that the Kurds or the Kurdish-led coalition controls, the US is based and providing protection. So it’s going to be a lot more difficult than Afrin, if Turkey was to try to dislodge the Kurdish forces.
SA: The US and Turkish governments have been at odds over the YPG militias. While the US military officials have regarded this group as an essential partner, the Turkish government, as you mentioned, states that the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and their YPG militias are closely linked to the PKK. At this juncture, how would you characterize US-Turkey relations and is there a reason for the US not to abandon the Kurds, when it has done it in the past. I mean if you look at the different history of the Kurds –
CG: Yes, I mean it’s possible that the US will abandon the Kurds. It depends on what the US wants to do in Syria, basically. Now, the initial objective was to defeat ISIS. That, more or less, has been done.
SA: Exactly.
CG: But now, the idea being expressed in policy circles is that we need to create a system where ISIS or ISIS-like entities are not recreating themselves or are not coming back. And for that, you need to have good governance, you need to have institutions that operate. And so far, the US seems to be committed to that goal. If you want to have stability in the region long-term, then the US needs to kind of stay in there for a while and to be part of efforts to stabilize the region. Turkey wants to prevent the US’s engagement in the region. If the US is to stay there, it says it can become the partner of the US and Turkey will achieve what the Kurds are trying to achieve. Turkey and the US have a long alliance – long-established relations – and for the US, it’s difficult to ignore Turkey’s request. They need to keep Turkey on board and they need to work with Turkey. The US’s preferred option would be to keep Turkey on board, but also not abandon the Kurds. But what Turkey is pushing for is for the US to abandon the Kurds and Turkey is using its newly-established ties with Russia as blackmail as well. It says, in a way, if you don’t allow me to achieve what I want, I will find other ways to do it.
SA: They did make an arrangement with Russians, as you mentioned, over Afrin.
CG: Yeah, exactly. In order to conduct airstrikes, Turkey had to get the permission of Russia and Russia gave that permission. And as a result of that, Turkey used air force to attack Kurdish positions, to destroy infrastructure, cause a lot of damage to the Kurdish forces. And it couldn’t have done that without Russia. And Russia is allowing that because, essentially, Russia wants to weaken the US. Now this is the contradictory part: now Turkey, is in a way, being part of an effort to weaken the US in Syria, but at the same time, by doing that, it is strengthening Russia, which is kind of an adversary of the US in the region. Because Erdogan is very pragmatic, he can change course very easily. He did that in the past, he can do that in the future. He was very good friends with Asad. You know, Erdogans and Asads were taking their summer holidays together. Then, suddenly, after the breakout of the conflict, he did a U-turn and started supporting the opposition to get rid of Asad. And in the past few months, there were indications that Turkey can come to some kind of a coexistence with Asad in some level, accept or recognize Asad’s regime. But as to how it will do that, we don’t know. They want to reestablish ties with Asad, but it seems that at the moment, that the basis of that relationship would be very, very narrow and presumably will be to prevent Kurdish autonomy from being consolidated. So when we look at the regional picture and when we look at what the US is trying to achieve in the region, it gets further complicated because one of the problems for the US is the influence of Iran in Syria. And Iran is likely to maintain its influence, or even increase it. And that’s a big problem for the US because it threatens Israel’s security. So in a way, it can draw Israel into the conflict as well, in order to prevent Iran or Iran-backed groups becoming more influential. Iran’s growing influence will also influence what Saudis do. Saudis are not going to be very happy with Iran gaining more influence. So Saudi Arabia will also feel threatened. For keeping the regional balance, America needs to remain in Syria. And in order to remain in Syria, I think it needs to keep its ties with the Kurds. So I don’t expect America to give up on the Kurds very soon. But at the same time, we need to be mindful that the pressure that Turkey is applying can influence US’s decisions, but it depends on whether America can find a way where Turkey can feel secure but without destroying the Kurds. At the moment, at least, it seems like an impossible task. But also, we have to look at the likely impact that Turkish invasion – a larger scale invasion of Kurdish-held territories – will have on the Kurdish question in Turkey. The conflict in Turkey has been accelerating, but it will further accelerate this conflict and will even lead to some kind of civil war where just individuals or civilians just kill each other. In Turkey, any large-scale Turkish invasion of Kurdish-held territory in Syria will likely to further accelerate the Kurdish conflict in Turkey and further destabilize the region. So I think that will be one factor in the minds of the policymakers in Turkey when and, or if, they decide to attack. But when we analyze Erdogan’s recent speeches and what he tries to do, it’s a very worrying scenario because he’s saying he wants to destroy the groups that he thinks are aligned with the PKK. He wants to destroy all Kurdish administrative regions in Syria. He’s planning or he says he’s planning and certainly saying that he’s going to conduct an operation inside Iraq against the PKK bases in the Qandil mountains. So it seems that he’s going to accelerate the conflict and he feels that this is the moment to do something if he’s going to. If the Kurdish forces in Syria continue to develop, if the Kurdish self-administration in Syria is consolidated, that will change the game in the Kurds’ favor forever and Turkey will have to accept the Kurdish autonomy or Kurdish rights in Syria and Turkey. In a way, Turkey will have to come to a cooperation or coexistence with the Kurds on terms that he doesn’t wish to accept.
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MR: That’s Dr. Cengiz Gunes speaking with Shahram Aghamir about the Turkish invasion of Afrin and the Turkish political and military objectives in Syria. We’ll hear more after a break
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SA: In a recent speech, Mr. Erdogan said, “We are not in a position to continue hosting 3.5 million refugees forever. We will solve the Afrin situation and we would like refugee brothers and sisters to return to their country.” That’s a quote from him. Also, in the early days of the military campaign in the Afrin region, he declared at a public rally that Afrin was originally majority-Arab and that the enclave would be returned to what he called it’s ‘rightful owners.’ But Afrin is predominantly Kurdish and promising to return hundreds of thousands of mainly Arab Syrian refugees has led to accusations that Mr. Erdogan’s government intends to dilute Afrin’s Kurdish makeup – that his government is using demographics to achieve domestic political goals. Given the fact that many Turks have concerns about the large number of Syrian refugees in Turkey, and the issue is likely to become a factor in the next election. Is this a credible assessment of what may be happening in terms of the calculus of Afrin and how Mr. Erdogan and his AKP party is approaching this issue?
CG: Yes, I think that’s a credible assessment and Erdogan has, on many occasions, stated and hinted that the Kurdish population will be displaced and will be replaced with a Syrian Arab population that is currently in Turkey as refugees. And in Turkey, there is a widespread opposition to the Syrian refugees. A large section of Turks hold the view that Turkey is doing too much for the Syrians, it is quite popular. And Erdogan needs to take the public opinion into account and he needs to present himself as someone who is working towards solving that refugee issue. And the invasion of Afrin kind of advances that narrative. So he’s saying he’s not only destroying the threat of a Kurdish enclave, but he’s also solving the refugee issue. In a way, he’s trying to kill two birds with one stone. And to the international forces, he will present it as part of a final solution to the Syrian conflict and will argue that such action will relieve the pressure on Turkey.
SA: And he may be presenting that to European powers.
CG: Yes, exactly, exactly. This is one part of the, sort of, the reason why the international organizations have been quite silence on Turkey’s action. In a way, they don’t want to antagonize Erdogan because Erdogan has, in the past, said that he will open the Turkish borders to Europe so that all the refugees will go to Europe and that will create a huge uproar in Europe and will create a big reaction. He knows that, so he’s always playing with that threat. And now, he’s presenting what he’s doing as a solution, as a long-term, durable solution. Afrin is a Kurdish-majority area and it’s been like that for a long time. It’s also quite, kind of, a diverse area. There are Alevi Kurds, there are Yazidi Kurds, Arabs, Armenians, and it’s been a symbol of peaceful coexistence. He wants to destroy that and then present it as a kind of doing something good for all of Syria. He’s presenting what he does as an action against Kurdish unilateral action and Kurdish attempts to control a territory that is essentially not theirs. And he is presenting his invasion as a move to regain those areas for the benefit of all Syrians. But most people who are – most Syrian refugees – who are in Turkey are not from Afrin, so it’s an obvious case of displacing the Kurds and replacing them with ethnic Turkmen or Arabs.
SA: Afrin was one of the cantons of the de facto autonomous Democratic Federation of Northern Syria, also known by this acronym of DFNS, also known as Rojava, which means “The West” in Kurdish. The region is undergoing an intriguing experience in exercise of people’s power, which has been termed ‘democratic autonomy’ and ‘democratic confederalism.’ Can you describe to us what this self-autonomy is and how does it function, particularly when a region is located in a conflict zone and has a pluralistic makeup?
CG: This idea of democratic autonomy and democratic confederalism was first developed by Abdullah Öcalan, who is the leader of the PKK and who is currently in jail in Turkey. And essentially, this is a model of autonomy that the PKK has also accepted and it’s about realizing Kurdish rights within the exiting states and without the need of creating a separate Kurdish state. Now, democratic autonomy is about decentralization of state power and creating kind of local level governance structures that will engage people in decision making about issues that concern them. It’s not an ethnic form of autonomy, so it’s not an autonomy for the Kurds only. It’s an autonomy for the whole of the region. This idea is actually quite complex and it developed in a very unusual way because Öcalan, as you know, he’s imprisoned. So he doesn’t have access to books or he cannot write and send his stuff out. He could only do that through the courts and he presented a lot of defenses. There are parts where there are contradictions and parts where new ideas have been added. So, in a way, it’s a complicated framework.
SA: For decades, Kurdish polity has been dominated by a nationalist discourse and a desire to establish a Kurdish nationalist state across the borders established by the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement. This model, proposed by both the PKK in Turkey and the Party for Democratic Unity – PYD in Syria, is a departure from that nationalist discourse, isn’t it? It’s more about creating, what they call, the model based on anti-capitalism and environmentalist perspectives and democratic institutions and civil rights.
CG: Yes. Basically, in Turkey, the PKK has been the dominant group. And during the 70s, 80s, and early 90s, it was fighting a guerilla war and the aim was to create a Kurdish state that will kind of take land from Turkey, Iran, and Syria. In a way, it was pan-Kurdist, and it conceptualized Kurdistan as a country and it was an international colony. It argued that it needed to organize a national liberation to overthrow the colonial rule and establish a nation-state for the Kurds and through a nation-state, it would liberate the Kurds. In a way, all the assimilation, all the repression that the Kurdish people were facing in terms of their culture and politics would be overcome only by a state. Now, in the early 1990s, the idea of establishing a Kurdish state began to lose its appeal and its credibility, if you like, because the states that the Kurds were fighting against were far more powerful than the Kurdish movements and these states were very nationalist. Militarily, they were very strong, or authoritarian. The Kurds didn’t have so much of a chance to overcome these states. And also, in Turkey, there kind of a possibility of reform and democratization, which could open it up for Kurdish political actors and for Kurdish identity to be recognized. Now, at that time, Turkey also indicated that it could be open to a settlement with the PKK and a kind of a peace process and accept some Kurdish rights and recognize Kurdish identity and, in a way, a way for Kurds and Turks to coexist in Turkey. In 1992, ‘95, and in ’97, there were a few ceasefires by the PKK, which were aimed at opening, or starting, a process for peace and resolving the Kurdish question through democracy. So, in a way, from the early 1990s, the idea of democratic accommodation of Kurdish rights within the existing states was becoming part of the debate. Now, in ’99, when Öcalan was caught by Turkey and subsequently he was imprisoned in Turkey, he began to develop a proto-model for accommodating Kurdish rights in Turkey and across the region. And this attempt was formulated around the twin concepts of democratic autonomy and democratic confederalism. Now, democratic autonomy is the state-level solution for the Kurds. So individual Kurdish conflicts will be resolved through establishment of democratic autonomy Turkey, in Syria, in Iraq, in Iran. And that is basically an arrangement between the Kurdish population and the states in those countries where Kurds obtain their national rights, but at the same time, the Kurds accept to remain part of those states. It has many different aspects to it and some accounts of democratic autonomy have emphasized this anti-capitalist, ecologist side of it. But at the core of this idea is the accommodation of Kurdish rights within the existing states. And it kind of pushes for the acceptance of Kurdish identity and the rights of Kurdish people within the states. But the states, crucially, should provide constitutional guarantees. So, the state should remove all obstacles in front of Kurdish language and culture developments and there should be like a general democratization of state structures. Now, the Middle East has a very centralized political structure in each country and is very authoritarian. And Öcalan thinks that the way the state is structured, the way politics is structured, needs to change. The society needs to become more dominant, in a way. People should organize within associations. He says people should be participating more in the decision making. And he proposes that societal organizations should be established and should be more empowered so that the states dominance over the society is reduced. So, in a way, he thinks that will open up space for people to organize themselves democratically and take part in resolving the issues that they face. The societal problem that people face can be resolved through participation of everyone and everyone should be part of the attempt to resolve it. It shouldn’t be left to the state.
SA: So more emphasis on the notion of direct democracy.
CG: Yes. It’s a form of direct democracy. And he says there should be assemblies, for example. So people should be organized in these assemblies, they should express their views, they should take part in the decision making. And he thinks that it’s possible that such a system, or such a structure is possible, if the states are decentralized. So, it’s a, kind of a bottom-up approach. So every village and every neighborhood in a city should have an assembly. And the people in the village or the neighborhood assembly should discuss their problems and they should elect representatives to represent them at the higher level – at the city level, and then at the regional level, and then at the state level. So it’s a kind of a pyramid structure, which involves all sorts of cultural groups in the society. So Kurds should have their own kind of self-governance and should have their own institutions in these states. But also, they should be part of the general management of that state. So Kurds are citizens of Turkey and should be represented in state institutions of Turkey, but also, they have their own self-government where they take decisions about the issues that concern them. So, in a way, that’s the democratic autonomy.
SA: And it seems to be a more viable solution for our times. And I’m referring to the age of neoliberal and global capital. The notion of a nation-state, in a way, is anachronistic today. It belonged to the era of struggle against colonialist powers and the attempt to create a nation-state. Trying to establish a nation-state in this age of global capital, it’s somewhat complicated and difficult. It seems like there are other things by virtue of which you can create a more cohesive structure, such as the issues of social justice, environmental justice, gender and ethnic issues, and things like that, where you form other types of solidarities.
CG: Yes, indeed. Öcalan himself presents a kind of history of nationalism, where he argues that the idea of every nation having its own state is outdated. In order to have national liberation, we don’t need to have a state, we don’t need to establish a state. There are other ways which we could achieve that. He kind of presents a detailed analysis of society and for him, a state, or the idea of organizing politics through a state, is a problematic one because it leads to the enslavement of the society, he says. The stronger the state, the less freedom the society has. And he’s arguing that we need to rebalance that relationship in favor of the society. So he doesn’t believe in total abolishment of states. What he says is that states should become a minimal state where –
SA: Power’s decentralized.
CG: Decentralized, yes, power is decentralized. but also as little as possible. Society should be empowered to make the decisions that it’s confronting. And there should be a general democratization. For Öcalan, without a democratization of the society and the states, the Kurdish question could not be resolved. And he believes that nation-states are part of capitalist development and that, in a way, they are there to produce capitalist relations, rather than produce or result in liberation of the people. So he believes in an alternative system, which he describes as democratic confederalism. And this is a situation where institutions from the grassroots are kind of established and, in a way, it brings the society into existence through institutions that start from the grassroot level that ends in the higher level. So for Öcalan and for the PKK, a Kurdish democratic confederalism is a non-state Kurdish entity that exists across different states and that provides representation to the Kurds in these states. So in a way, Kurds will exist as a nation, will be able to recreate themselves as a nation, but without a state. Essentially, it’s about establishing Kurdish self-governing communities that will be autonomous. It’s proposed as an alternative to the nationalist and statist solutions.
SA: It’s a different project.
CG: Yeah, it’s a completely different project. It’s based on promotional fraternity between different groups and democratic unity of the nations. It’s a project that is aimed at furthering democracy in society.
SA: But at the same time, the way it’s being presented, you’d take that adjective ‘Kurdish’ out of it, right?
CG: Well, we need further clarification here. In Syria, for example, this Democratic Federation of Northern Syria, that is not a specifically Kurdish entity.
SA: Precisely.
CG: That is an entity for everybody in Syria. And every group – Arabs, Turkomen, Chechens, Assyrians, Armenians, Kurds, every group – have a right, at least that’s how it’s presented, have a right to establish their own self-government to protect their own cultural identity, to promote the use of their language, you know, all those issues that affect or that concern that specific group. They should have a right to organize themselves and provide services in those areas. Where we get to kind of the pan-Kurdish level, so when we look at all Kurds in the Middle East, this democratic confederalism is meant to bring all Kurdish self-governments together. So democratic autonomy compliments democratic confederalism. So Kurds will exist as a group and will remain a part of the existing states, but also they will establish institutions that will represent them and that will allow them to constitute themselves as a nation. So sort of in abstract terms.
SA: How do you explain the lack of support the Kurds have received from progressives during Turkey’s invasion of Afrin? You don’t really witness displays of solidarity by the international left. Here you have a member of NATO, with the help from some Islamist and Salafi forces, launching an invasion to crush what you just described as a Leftist movement with democratic aspirations. But you don’t see anything close to the outrage displayed by the Left that we normally see in other instances, such as when the Israeli military attacks Gaza and Palestinians. You mentioned the issue of refugees and how Erdogan is playing the refugee card, but does that explain it.
CG: The main reason is that among the international kind of progressive forces, that their knowledge of the Kurdish struggle isn’t, perhaps, very well developed. They think the Kurds are just there for themselves, they’re just fighting for their own particularistic rights, that it’s a nationalist project. Nationalism is kind of a bad word. They don’t develop as much solidarity with the Kurds.
SA: But I just gave you another example of a nationalist project, the issue of Palestine, which is, rightly so, the Left and progressives should be supporting that cause.
CG: But, of course, it is an international issue. Everyone has a view of Palestine. There are lot of Palestine or Palestinian-led organizations. In contrast, there aren’t so many such groups or organizations for the Kurds. And I think it’s because of the lack of knowledge, I think that’s one factor. Another factor is that these states that the Kurds live in have kind of used their means to prevent the development of solidarity towards Kurdish people. For example, Turkey has been consistently describing the Kurdish struggle in Turkey as terrorism and that kind of narrative has been accepted by many people. Journalists use the same language that the Turkish state uses. They give the example of the PKK attacks. They use such attacks as a way of justifying Turkish action. These states have a very sophisticated propaganda apparatus which they use to prevent Kurds from gaining more sympathy. This –
SA: Do you think it has anything to do with the criticism by some Leftists of the YPG’s military cooperation with the US?
CG: The YPG came into being in 2011 and it’s generally accepted as the kind of armed wing of the PYD, but the people who speak for the YPG describe themselves as a force for the whole region and they don’t see themselves as just a representative of a political party. They are the force of the autonomous region and they protect everyone, so they say. The PYD is currently the dominant political party in Syria and it was established in 2003 by the former members of the PKK who were from Syria. So the Kurds in Syria who were part of the PKK left the PKK and formed the PYD. And the PKK and PYD have a kind of ideological affiliation. For Kurds in Turkey and for Kurds in Syria, in a way, they see both as part of a bigger Kurdish movement for accommodating Kurdish rights and gaining recognition of Kurdish identity, protecting Kurdish culture. The people who argue that the PYD and the PKK are the same highlight the ideological links and also mention that the people who make the decisions in the PYD and the PKK are the same. It’s two different branches of the same organization, if you like. That’s how they say. But the PYD and opportunities that the conflict in Syria has provided it have enabled the Kurds in Syria to achieve a much greater recognition than the PKK could ever do. For example, at the height of its power, the PKK had something around 15,000, maybe 20,000 guerillas. But at the moment, the YPG is something around 50,000 and the SDF, the Syrian Democratic Forces, is something around 80,000. So the PYD, or the YPG and the SDF, are much bigger in terms of military forces than the PKK. The relationship between America and the YPG has been sighted by some Leftists as proof that the Kurdish project in Syria is not a revolutionary project. It’s cooperating with essentially an imperialist power – that nothing good will come out. I think these arguments miss the point of the threat that organizations like ISIS pose to the Kurds and to the international community as well. And the Kurds, in a way, had to draw on the support of the US forces in order to defeat ISIS. So cooperating with America in order to defeat ISIS doesn’t contradict the Kurdish project. What they say, these critics, is that, essentially, America will dictate the terms to the Kurdish-led autonomous organization. And all this talk of Leftist, anti-capitalist rhetoric is just not going to happen. I mean we don’t know what will happen in the future, but so far, the YPG, the SDF, they see America as a partner to defeat the threat posed by ISIS and such organizations. And they present their own project to the international community, which is about coexistence in Syria and a democratic Syria and a secular Syria.
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MR: Dr. Cengiz Gunes is an associate lecturer at the Open University in the UK. He is the author of The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey: From Protest to Resistance and coauthor of The Kurdish Question in Turkey: New Perspectives on Violence, Representation, and Reconciliation. He spoke with a Status contributor, Shahram Aghamir.
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MR: You’ve been listening to Status Audio Magazine. Status is produced by the Arab Studies Institute, in partnership with Voices of the Middle East and North Africa, cosponsored by George Mason University’s Middle Eastern Studies program, and the American University of Beirut’s Asfari Institute for Civil Society and Citizenship. Interested in pitching an interview, a program episode, or becoming a partner? Email our associate producer, Paola Messina at paola@statushour.com. To listen to more conversations, on the scene reports, and discussions, visit our website, www.statushour.com, or subscribe via iTunes and listen to us on the go. You can also friend us on Facebook and follow us on Twitter.
